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Point of Care (PoC) devices and systems can be categorized into three broad 
classes (CAT 1, CAT 2, and CAT 3) based on the context of operation and 
usage. In this paper, the categories are defined to address certain usage models 
of the PoC device. PoC devices that are used for PoC testing and diagnostic 
applications are defined CAT 1 devices; PoC devices that are used for patient 
monitoring are defined as CAT 2 devices (PoCM); PoC devices that are used 
for as interfacing with other devices are defined as CAT 3 devices (PoCI). The 
PoCI devices provide an interface gateway for collecting and aggregating data 
from other medical devices. In all categories, data security is an important as-
pect. This paper presents a security framework concept, which is applicable 
for all of the classes of PoC operation. It outlines the concepts and security 
framework for preventing security challenges in unauthorized access to data, 
unintended data flow, and data tampering during communication between 
system entities, the user, and the PoC system. The security framework in-
cludes secure layering of basic PoC system architecture, protection of PoC de-
vices in the context of application and network. Developing the security 
framework is taken into account of a thread model of the PoC system. A pro-
posal for a low-level protocol is discussed. This protocol is independent of 
communications technologies, and it is elaborated in relation to providing 
security. An algorithm that can be used to overcome the threat challenges has 
been shown using the elements in the protocol. The paper further discusses 
the vulnerability scanning process for the PoC system interconnected net-
work. The paper also presents a four-step process of authentication and au-
thorization framework for providing the security for the PoC system. Finally, 
the paper concludes with the machine to machine (M2M) security viewpoint 
and discusses the key stakeholders within an actual deployment of the PoC 
system and its security challenges. 
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With the exponential rise in clinical devices such as PoC systems [1], clinical 
network security has become a major issue for biomedical teams and health care 
organizations [2]. Because of the need for multiplexed detection of viral infec-
tions without any easy access to a lab, management of future outbreaks become 
more involved with the compact portable point of care test devices [3]. Based on 
the “State of the Internet report” published by Akamai, Port 80 was the top tar-
geted port by advisories in US [4]. In addition, Port 443 [5] based attacks were 
seen primarily in Indonesia [4]. Port 80 is for the application based on Hyper 
Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP) and use of port 443 for the applications based on 
the Secure-HTTP (HTTPS). Targeting ports 80 and 443 implies that the adviso-
ries were targeting web-based applications (both HTTP and HTTPS) which are 
very popular among smartphone users. Smartphones use medical applications 
based both on the web as well as device specific applications. Clinical instru-
ments and devices such as a PoCT that connect via the smartphone have grown 
more than 60% in 2012 [2]. As more devices are added, there is an increasing 
concern with respect to security of the data transmitted in a clinical setup. 
The PoC device systems can be classified into three broad categories as shown 
in Figure 1. The categories are testing, healthcare monitoring and alert and in-
terfacing with existing other health monitoring devices. All the classes of the de-
vices need to have strategies and processes to deal with the security concerns. 
The current ways of providing security are specific to applications. The IoT 
related security proposal are available. There is a method for authentication 
process which is applicable to IoT is described [6]. A proposal for secure com-
munication protocol specifically for the healthcare IoT has been discussed [7]. A 
security framework for general to address IoT security issues has been outlined 
[8]. There is need to authenticate the user and the system and the methods and 
processes are evolving [9]. A method for preventing energy depletion security 
attacks with ZigBee is explained [10]. A review of security challenges and exiting 
architectures in the fast growing IoT system has been documented [11]. The 
important need for having a holistic security framework is mentioned [12]. 
Though the cloud based storage for medical data is convenient, the accessing of 
data from the cloud has security issues and the data must be accessed securely 
[13]. The IoT security can be accomplish in many ways including having the 
HW and biometrics defense [14]. The challenges of developing m-Health se-
curely for defending privacy of the user community is one of the key aspects in 
interconnected medical systems [15]. It is very crucial to have security systems to 
work with multiple interconnected systems that may use multiple communica-
tion technologies [16]. There is a need to enhance security of communication 
links any IoT type of systems for preserving patient’s anonymity [17]. 
Therefore it is important to have a security framework independent of com-
munication technologies and medical applications with flexible enough to use 
universally. The security framework presented may be used within a hospital 
network scenario or any other healthcare clinical establishment in which a PoCT  




Figure 1. Device usage categories. 
 
is carried out remotely. This paper provides a security framework that can be 
used in the context of the PoCT devices, system, and networks. The framework 
is independent of SW and HW of the PoC device. 
2. PoCT Configurations 
2.1. Architecture Layering 
There are three high-level layers as shown Figure 2. The P-Node represents a 
PoCT device; the G-Node represents a smartphone or another device used for 
accessing the PoCT device, and the P-Cloud represents the data collection end-
point. The three layers outlined here form the basis for security portioning. 
Consider the following POC configurations or operational scenarios: 
1) The P-Node communicates with the P-cloud without any intermittent ga-
teway entities such as smartphones. 
2) Integration of the P-Node and the G-Node as one single unit; i.e. the 
G-Node, which is a smartphone, has all the required sensors and control built-in 
to conduct the PoCT processes. 









Figure 2. High-Level architecture layers. 
 
In the first case, the PoCT device and associated infrastructure combined pro-
vide security functionality. In the 2nd case, the G-Node together with the asso-
ciated infrastructure assures security. In both instances, a layered model requires 
a partition strategy that protects all components in the network (PoCT devices, 
network equipment, secure gateway and secure clouds). This layering approach 
provides physical security for the end to end system. The layering approach 
needs to be architected dependent upon the PoC device deployment. 
2.2. Security Layering 
The designers and architects provide the layering security architecture for the 
PoC device and PoC service infrastructure. The system implementers of the PoC 
device and the service providers must ensure that updated security technologies 
and security products are used to secure data on the PoC device and its asso-
ciated network infrastructure. 
A management layer for managing administrative functions and organiza-
tional policies ensures that the patient uses the PoC deployment securely. Service 
operators involved in PoC deployment use the management layer to configure 
security and privacy policies on the PoC infrastructure. 
As shown in Figure 3, all the partitioned layers of security coexist to provide 
secure data transfer between key entities (P-Node, G-Node, and P-Cloud). 
3. Definition of Asset in PoC 
Within the PoC domain, an asset is the value of data collected from patients 
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during PoCT. A threat model ([18] [19]) aids understanding of any potential 
threat scenarios and threat agents who are deemed likely to carry out a threat. 
For threat modeling with respect to PoC, a threat modeling tool shows the threat 
paths for the PoC system. 
Attack Tree for PoC System 
An attack tree [20] [21] has been built for analyzing the PoC system security im-






Figure 3. Secure layering of the basic architecture. 
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Figure 4. Threat path tree (attack tree). 
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The Freeport scanner shows that the ports have been configured as filtered 
(using open source tool [22]: “Network Mapper”, also known as “Nmap”). The 
state is either defined as, open, and filtered, closed or unfiltered. Open means 
that an application on the target machine is listening for connections or packets 
on that port. Filtered means that a firewall, filter, or another network activity is 
blocking the port. Therefore, Nmap cannot determine whether it is open or 
closed. The closed ports have no application listening to them (i.e. they are 
available to use), and an application can open them at any time [23]. Ports are 
identified as unfiltered when they are responsive to the Nmap probes. However 
the Nmap cannot determine whether they are open or closed [23]. 
The setup configuration used to experiment with the tool is shown in Figure 5. 
Figure 6 displays the configuration of the Nmap tool. Figure 7 shows the output 
of a sample scan run. 
 
 
Figure 5. Port scanning setup. 
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4. Use Cases 
In the PoC domain, an intruder targets applications, run on the P-node or 
G-Node which range from web application attacks, client-side attacks, and buf-
fer overflow attacks [24]. 
4.1. Web-Based PoC Access 
Web-based applications are one of the ways in which application developers 
create smartphone applications that will be used to control the P-node. One of 
the mechanisms to secure web applications is to apply well-known security har-
dening patches for web servers and provide adequate network protection. 
Figure 8 shows the application of the Web server that was running on the  
 
 
Figure 7. Scanned results. 
 
 
Figure 8. Embedded Web server with PoC. 
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PoC device. The PoC device was situated behind a firewall and a router. This 
configuration is an example of a protected network behind a firewall. 
Web browsers are a readily available feature on any smartphone. An embed-
ded web server was implemented in the PoC device, and a public Internet IP ad-
dress was provided (via port forwarding at the router) for access to the web 
server. The smartphone was able to obtain the IP address to look at the PoC 
measurement data using the embedded web browser. 
Common web application attacks such as cross-site scripting, SQL injection, 
XML injection and command injection are also applicable to PoC systems. Any 
HTTP request from the smartphone may be subject to these common web at-
tacks. 
4.2. Cross-Site Scripting 
In the cross-site scripting (XSS) attack in the context of PoC access, malicious 
instructions can be sent to the smartphone browser. A standard browser cannot 
distinguish between valid code and a malicious script, and it accepts user input 
without validation. The main goal of the XSS is to steal information that is re-
tained by the browsers. Therefore, it is necessary to have an approved browser 
that is configured to run PoCT web applications. The standard browsers availa-
ble on the smartphones are not advisable for accessing medical applications. 
There are secure frameworks available for developing secure mobile embedded 
browsers [25]. There are many techniques has been developed to secure brows-
ers for data transfer [26]. Applications such as MedCheck [27] are needed on the 
smartphones for PoC applications. For developing embedded secure web serv-
ers, an architecture similar to Sizzle platform is required in securing PoC web 
servers [28]. 
4.3. SQL Injection 
By entering an incorrectly formatted e-mail address, an attacker attempts to 
analyze whether the input is being validated. Then the attacker will use SQL 
statements to collect data from the database. This illegal, unauthorized access of 
data can be prevented if all the fields are validated in the HTTP website code. To 
ensure that the data field validation is implemented, a mandatory requirement 
must be created. This requirement will be implemented and tested before the 
deployment of the web application. 
4.4. XML Injection 
HTML instructs the browser to display text in a particular format. XML carries 
data instead of indicating how to display it using a predefined set of tags, mostly 
defined by the user application. If the website that does not filter user data, it will 
be prone to XML tag injection. This process will modify data stored in the 
P-Cloud database. By implementing the requirement for data filtering, the XML 
injection attacks can be prevented. 
A compromised G-Node will lead attacks on the web server that resides with-
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in the PoC device. An attacker can gain access to the operating system on the 
PoC device via the infected G-Node. One of the HTTP header fields is called a 
referrer field that indicates the site that generated the web page. Attackers can 
modify this field to hide the fact it came from another website (a website similar 
to PoC web server); a modified web page hosted from attacker’s computer. The 
accept-language field is another HTTP header; some web applications pass con-
tents of this field directly to database (P-Cloud). This field could be used to in-
ject SQL commands to get patient data. 
4.5. Client-Side Attacks 
So far the attacks related to the web applications have been discussed. Serv-
er-side attacks and client-side attacks also target vulnerabilities that exist in 
client applications. Examples of a client side attack are that the client application 
interacts with a compromised server or the client initiate a connection to the 
server, which could result in an assault. 
The security of the G-Node, i.e. the client computer, can be compromised 
simply by viewing a web page. Attackers can inject content into the vulnerable 
web server and gain access to server’s operating system. 
4.6. Malware Attacks 
Malware is software [29] that enters a computer system without the owner’s 
knowledge or consent. These are spread through computer viruses and worms 
[30]. Trojans, rootkits, logic bombs and backdoors are all forms of malware. 
Malware with a profit motive includes botnets, spyware, adware, and keystroke 
loggers. 
Social engineering [31] is a means of gathering information for an attack from 
individuals. Types of social engineering approaches include phishing [32], im-
personation [33], dumpster diving [34], and tailgating. 
Malware can be downloaded to the G-Node without the knowledge of the us-
er. Attackers develop a zero pixel frame to avoid visual detection and embed an 
HTML document inside the main document. When the browser used by the 
G-Node downloads a malicious script, it instructs the G-Node to download 
malware. Therefore, it is very critical that the G-Node must be loaded with suit-
able anti-malware software to detect any malware downloads. 
4.7. Cookies and Attachments 
Cookies store user-specific information on the G-Node. The cookies are used to 
identify repeat visitors such as travel websites to store user’s travel itinerary and 
personal information provided when visiting a site. Only the Web site that 
created the cookie can read it. 
There are a number of types of cookie used. Website users create a first-party 
cookie when they visit a website. Website advertisers use a third-party cookie to 
record user preferences. A number of cookies will also be used when a web-based 
PoC application is accessed on the G-Node. A few scenarios which involve the 
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use of cookies are outlined; a session cookie is stored in the RAM and expires 
when the browser closes. The G-Node records a persistent cookie on its drive, 
and the persistence cookie does not expire when the browser closes. A secure 
cookie is used when a browser visits the server over a secure connection, which 
is always encrypted. A flash cookie uses more memory than a traditional cookie, 
and it cannot be deleted through browser configuration settings. Given this wide 
range of cookie types, cookies pose security and privacy risks and if stolen it can 
be used to impersonate a user and can, therefore, be exploited by attackers to 
steal data from the G-Node. 
Session hijacking is a malicious process used by an attacker to impersonate a 
user by stealing or guessing the session token when the G-Node communicates 
with the web server. To prevent this kind of attacks the G-Node to P-node and 
the G-Node to P-Cloud links must be encrypted using well-known encryption 
algorithms. 
Buffer overflow is an anomaly in the software code where the buffer bounda-
ries are not checked during data writing. An attacker uses any buffer overflow to 
steal data by attempting to store data in RAM beyond boundaries of fixed-length 
storage buffer, which cause data overflow into adjacent memory locations. This 
attack may cause the G-Node or the P-Node to stop functioning and open an 
unintended pathway in which the attacker can change the “return address”, to 
redirects to an address containing malware code. 
4.8. Denial of Service (DoS) 
The DoS attempts to prevent the system from performing normal functions by 
pinging a flood attack, therefore sending a large number of echo request mes-
sages, which in turn overwhelms web server. It is possible to send a ping request 
and alter the original IP address, thus mimicking the target G-Node; therefore 
an attacker can acquire specific responses from all the devices connected to the 
network. 
Dangerous attack types include the SYNC flood attack and the DDoS (Distri-
buted DoS [35]) attack. In the SYNC flood attack, the attacker takes advantage of 
procedures for establishing a connection. 
In the DDoS, the attacker uses many zombie G-Nodes (G-Nodes connected to 
the Internet that has been compromised by a hacker) to flood a device with re-
quests from non-existence IP addresses. The source of the attack is impossible to 
identify and, therefore, cannot be blocked. 
In order to prevent any of the security attacks described above (see Figure 9), 
the PoC network requires a separate entity for security management [36] [37]. 
The separate entity is a network element (S-Node) for monitoring security. The 
S-Node is a specific kind of node which needs to be updated with all the latest 
security signatures of known vulnerabilities. DoS attacks can be prevented [38] 
by utilizing a static IP address (that are known to an administrative domain) 
plan for PoC system deployments. Even if an attacker imitates the DoS attack, 
this can be easily detected with the static IP configuration. 
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Figure 9. Distributed Deniyal of service (DoS) attacks. 
5. Security Framework 
There are many approaches available for providing security (mainly for identity 
and data protection) for the PoC system environment. Methodologies and tech-
niques already exist for providing information protection in the industry. A list 
of few notable methodologies are listed here; a biometric-based identification, 
user identification based on behavioral analytic process (including the Big Data 
approach), challenge and response mechanism and the multi-attribute access 
process. The method used is to establish a trust relationship with the PoC system 
network nodes, especially the P-Node, G-Node, and P-Cloud. Two main ap-
proaches are outlined in the following sections. Two main approaches are out-
lined in the following sections. 
5.1. The Protocol Used between the G-Node and the P-Node 
A communication protocol can be used to help accomplish data security. In a 
closed system, the protocol format can contribute in providing security protec-
tion for the asset, which is the data collected during PoC testing. Any violators 
will not be able to determine the data unless if they have got hold of the protocol 
format. 
5.2. Security Mechanism-1 (Challenge and Response Based) 
As shown in Figure 10, it is assumed that the network connectivity between the 
three main nodes has been established. At this point, the G-Node attempts to 
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start a PoCT process using a native application or a web-based application. The 
OPCODE for START in section 5.1 is used to begin the assay process by the us-
er. A security challenge is sent to the G-Node from the PoC device to list the op-
erational capabilities of the PoC. These interactions are shown as by #1 in Figure 
10. The user device (which is the G-Node) will respond with a list of known op-
erational codes that are provisioned by the operator. The PoC device selects a 
subset of OPCODEs from the received list and queries the G-Node for the last 
known list of OPCODEs. This particular information must come from the 
P-Cloud. If the G-Node has the authorization to retrieve information from the 
P-Cloud, then it can obtain the requested OPCODEs. This interaction is de-
picted by #2 in Figure 10. 
Once the history of the operational codes is retrieved from the P-Cloud, the 
G-Node informs the PoC with the OPCODEs list. If the data matches the 
records in the PoC device, then the user is allowed to continue the interaction 
with the PoC for testing. Figure 11 shows a summary of the interactions. 
5.3. Security Mechanism-2 (Behavioral Based) 
In this method, the user is first authenticated with the G-Node by the standard 
methods such as the G-Node device password and network password in order to 
access services. Step 1, shows the process of user authentication with a gateway 
in Figure 12. 
The next step (shown as Step 2: Application authorization) involves establish-
ing a security relationship with PoC app authorization server. The PoC applica-
tion authorization server is responsible for providing approvals for the G-Node 
users to use a particular application or a set of PoC applications. The application  
 
 
Figure 10. Interaction of messaging mechanism. 
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Figure 12. Security mechanism: behavioral-based. 
 
authorization process is triggered when user attempt to start a PoC application 
from the G-Node (via G-Node user interface). 
The authorization process requires few metadata attributes that are related to 
actual data. There are metadata attributes available that can be used for the au-
thorization process (e.g. an identifier for the PoC application, a user identifica-
tion parameter such as SIM card and MEID [39] or IMIE [40] of the G-Node). 
These data attributes must be validated by the PoC application server prior to 
PoC testing. The purpose of step 3 (validation of previous trust relationship) are 
an assertion, and validation of the relationships existed between P-Cloud, 
G-Node, and PoC device, prior to the current test. This process is very similar to 
the security mechanism in section 5.2. 
An entity called PoCT process authorization server is introduced. The pur-
pose of the authorization server is to manage who can execute certain assay types 
on the PoC. The server is responsible for creating a PoCT authorization success 
certificate, which is an outcome of the record of the validation process for step 3. 
Step 3 can be modified using Big Data techniques to identify the user. 
6. M2M Security in PoCT 
Deployment and operation of PoC systems are encompassed by cellular or short 
range communication M2M [41] technology. The cellular M2M system differs 
from current cellular networks in three important ways. 
The cellular network services today are typically offered by a single service 
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provider who owns the distribution of devices with the SIM card distribution, 
device provisioning, network infrastructure, and service delivery for voice and 
data services. On the other hand with the cellular M2M, multiple operators and 
network vendors offer services. These players have limited business relationships 
among them. 
For example, in the case of entities involved in providing M2M solutions for 
power metering are the utility company that provides application, cellular access 
network provider, meter manufacturer, and end-user. These entities do not nec-
essarily trust each other. Hence providing a security implementation in this en-
vironment is very challenging. 
Secondly, M2M communication does not have intensive data transmission 
that could lead to lower financial earnings for the players involved. Fewer eco-
nomic outcomes lead to less interest in implementing a security related layer 
that is not very cost effective for business survival. 
Thirdly, unlike cellular phones, smartphones, or wireless-enabled laptops, 
M2M devices are often unattended and are subjected to a higher risk of mali-
cious mischief and misuse. However, in the case of PoCT, there is a user who has 
ownership of the PoC device. 
This dynamics between the main stakeholders suggests that the current secu-
rity mechanisms in place today for mobile devices in the cellular networks are 
not appropriate for M2M applications. 
The device manufacturer and the M2M service providers may not have a 
business relationship or predefined mutual trust. The users may buy devices on 
the open market. In the case of PoC market, there are authorized drug stores or 
authorized medical devices dealers who are involved in the sales and marketing 
of the devices and services. In the medical applications such as the PoC, the PoC 
device user may not even be aware of the existence of a virtual network operator 
who is providing the service on behalf of the owner of an organization that owns 
a PoCT application. However, securing usage of the application is critical to all 
stakeholders. 
6.1. Trust Relationships between POC System Entities 
Table 1 shows the business relationships involved in M2M service delivery for a 
PoCT. This scenario is applicable for PoCT at home as well as in the hospital. A 
health care or medical institution acquires PoCT devices from a vendor compa-
ny and distributes these to the end-users (end-consumers, the patients) who 
have subscribed to the service. The health care institution owns and deploys the 
PoCT devices in the premises or hospitals of the end-consumers. The medical 
institution subscribes to the M2M service from an M2M service provider for 
PoCT data collection and device management. The M2M service providers are 
usually the telecom carriers (operators, e.g. AT & T [42]). The M2M service pro-
vider, in turn, has business relationships with network providers (e.g. Ericsson 
[43]) for the use of the bandwidth for transmission of data. The table below 
shows the various entities and the relationships between them. A similar table is 
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Table 1. Main players and security relationships. 
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used to describe the metering service [41]. 
Given the above summary, note that the complexity of the PoC M2M ecosys-
tem is strongly characterized by diverse business and trust relationships, which 
cannot be accurately predicted during the design of security solutions. For this 
reason, security protocol design for M2M systems has to assume inherently that 
the M2M service provider may not have trust relationships with other stake-
holders in the ecosystem. Therefore a collection of suitable security strategies for 
the case of M2M is required along with design recommendations for appropriate 
security solutions in the context of the PoCT system design. 
6.2. Security Compromising Scenarios 
The PoCT devices can be misused for their access capabilities by attackers pre-
tending to be the back-end application server. A scenario, where such an attack 
could be of some economic value to the attacker, is the selling of PoCT data or 
using the PoCT device to gain control over other devices or systems. By pretend-
ing to be the PoC application server, attackers can penetrate other barriers and 
reach other business applications (such as mobile banking applications) on the 
user’s devices. The PoCT devices (G-Node and P-Node) must be protected from 
unauthorized entities trying to establish communications to and from the devices. 
The data collected from the M2M enabled PoCT devices are sensitive in na-
ture. For example, the data may contain information that can be used against the 
user by insurance organizations. Thus, the (M2M security) PoCT security solu-
tion must be such that it is not possible to acquire information about the stored 
data by eavesdropping at any point within the network. The security framework 
in section 4 ensures prevention of any such attempts to access the network in an 




Identity information can be correlated with other data such as the location of 
data of the network elements from which the identity data is retrieved to discern 
some patterns. In the case of PoC, it is important that the identity of the end- 
customer is not available from a public database [41]. Therefore, the device 
should not transmit unencrypted data relating to the user identity [41]. Well- 
known, robust encryption mechanisms must be used, rather than reinventing 
new algorithms [44]. 
Low-cost health care devices such as heart rate monitors are required to send 
data collected by a server in a single data connection session. This design can be 
easily compromised by clever adversaries [41]. The proposed architecture model 
in Section 5 encourages multiple communication sessions to be established with 
the main network entities before the data access is granted. 
The PoCT device is a non-mobile entity in the system. Moreover, by physical-
ly accessing the device without authorization causes three main problems. Firstly 
the data can be taken from the SD card. Secondly, the credentials from the UICC 
(Universal Integrated Circuit Card or SIM card) can be taken if the PoCT has a 
cellular access interface. Thirdly, since there is no need for the hand-offs (device 
mobility is not required) to different base stations or radio access network, the 
intruder easily identify the associated network and hence the device identity. 
It is essential that appropriate SLA (service level agreements) between all 
stakeholders (Table 1) involved being in place prior to system deployment and 
this must include security as one of the main items. The integrity of data stored 
in the PoCT device after the testing process can be tampered. It is possible to 
masquerade as another PoCT device and upload incorrect data to the P-cloud. 
6.3. Core Security Requirements for POC M2M 
Based on the scenarios discussed above, a list of core security requirements can 
be formulated [45]. 
Authentication: Mutual authentication procedures need to be carried out by 
the PoCT device and the PoCT operator network before initiating PoCT testing 
and the data transfer. 
Confidentiality: Unauthorized data eavesdropping must be prevented be-
tween the application server and the PoCT device. 
Data Integrity: Unauthorized data manipulations or modifications must be 
prevented between all entities in the PoCT system. 
Exclusive Access: The PoCT device must use only authenticated PoCT ap-
plications that are available from the apps provider’s apps marketplace, and the 
network operator should prevent any other use. 
Identity: The identity of the PoCT device or the user must not be revealed to 
any intruders in the event of security compromises. 
6.4. Bootstrapping Requirements for POCT Device Deployments 
The bootstrapping process can be defined as initial processes that must be run 
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before the PoCT device can be used for PoC testing [46]. The PoCT device eco-
system is complex in nature which involves security relationships that must be 
established between the four key stakeholders (PoCT Device Users, PoCT De-
vice, Network Providers, M2M operators and PoCT Application Provider). 
During the bootstrapping process, the trust relationships between the four main 
entities must be established successfully. The scalability of the PoCT devices 
deployment is a major factor as the ecosystem expands with the growth of the 
PoCT device users. Registering of the PoCT device on a network needs to 
comply with the 3 GPP standards [47] (including specialized requirements spe-
cified by the network providers and the operators [48]). The bootstrapping 
process will start after the successful network registration. Due to business rea-
sons, the application provider, or the PoCT user may change operators, and the 
bootstrapping process must ensure forward and backward compatibility between 
the network operators keeping the network boundary agreements intact. 
7. Conclusions 
In this paper security mechanisms are discussed that can be used for three main 
PoC configurations (PoC for testing, PoC as the patient monitoring device and 
PoC as an interfacing device). It should be noted that the security mechanisms 
discussed here do not depend on the mentioned configurations; this applies to 
PoC operation and systems in general. 
An attack tree model is presented considering the main assets that are re-
quired to be secured including the collected data. Port scanning results are pre-
sented (using Nmap process) given that the constructed asset tree in a real sce-
nario where the PoC is used within a secure in-house environment. The purpose 
of showing the process is to emphasize the need for the port scanning process 
for security validation of the PoC system on a continuous basis. Any applications 
within the PoC system can potentially create security violations if they are con-
ducted without security guidelines for developing PoC applications. A rigorous 
process for accepting any PoC applications must be in place along with a securi-
ty monitoring center for PoC installations. 
The security concerns that are applicable to any web based system that is very 
much applicable to PoC web-based systems. The use of embedded web server 
within the PoC is discussed with potential security vulnerabilities such as cross- 
site scripting, SQL injection, XML injection and command injection. 
Given that fact the vulnerabilities issues in the PoC system are unavoidable, 
methods (security framework) for managing security risks have been discussed. 
The communication protocol developed (close communication) for the PoC 
system is the first defense process for securing the data asset. Two kinds of secu-
rity mechanisms have been discussed, challenge and response based and data 
behavioral based. All the methods discussed here are independent of communi-
cation technologies and Radio Access Technologies such as 2G, 3G, and 4G. 
Finally, M2M security that applies to PoC is discussed. The PoC system is a 
good example of the M2M communication environment. The PoC deployment 
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depends on a successful working relationship between multiple stakeholders (or 
entities); PoCT device users, PoCT device, network providers, M2M operators, 
PoCT application providers and the PoCT vendors (OEMs). The key M2M re-
quirements for successful PoC device deployment have been mentioned. The 
PoC M2M security is a complex issue, which needs not only a technology colla-
boration but also requires political harmony among the main organizations in-
volved. 
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